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JoShua r. ShifrinSon
Abstract
President Donald Trump has not been shy about trying to coerce close allies. This inclination has led to concerns that the president poses a unique threat to American alliances. Theoretically, these 
concerns are consistent with an influential line of argument pointing to 
strategic restraint and reassurance—via binding institutions—as what sets 
American alliances apart. However, the Trump presidency is not the first 
time that the shadow of exit has hung over the United States’ commit-
ment to Europe. Indeed, a closer look at the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization’s (NATO) formative period shows that the United States actively 
considered leaving Europe throughout the 1950s. Even after resigning 
itself to staying in the early 1960s, the United States used threats of aban-
donment to put down the Franco- German revolt—the most significant 
challenge to its preponderant position in the NATO alliance. The primary 
implication is that American alliance relations have been characterized by 
more uncertainty—and less restraint and reassurance—than institutionalists 
have cared to emphasize, which paradoxically suggests that NATO, and 
the United States’ broader alliance network, is robust enough to survive 
President Trump’s attempts at coercion.
*****
A prominent line of argument points to institutions as what sets Ameri-
can alliances apart. John Ikenberry, in particular, has claimed that the 
United States has had to engage in strategic restraint to reassure weaker 
states that it would not dominate or abandon them.1 Otherwise, he notes, 
they would have incentives to balance against American power. Accord-
ingly, the United States has gone out of its way to restrain itself and build 
a cooperative framework characterized by binding institutions. Doing so, 
in turn, has made weaker states—like those in Europe—amenable to 
American leadership.2 “American power is made more acceptable to other 
states because it is institutionalized,” as Ikenberry has argued.3 As a liberal 
democracy, the United States has been uniquely well positioned to engage 
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in strategic restraint and bind itself via institutions; this ability explains 
the persistence of American- led alliances. “American power,” according to 
Ikenberry, “is not only unprecedented in its preponderance but it is also 
unprecedented in the way it is manifest within and through institutions. 
This helps explain why it has been so durable.”4
In direct contradiction to the institutionalist logic, President Trump has 
not been shy about coercing even close allies. This inclination has led to 
concerns that the president poses a unique threat to American alliances. 
The concern is especially acute in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), the United States’ mainstay alliance in Europe. 
Rather than underline NATO’s value, as his predecessors have done, 
Trump has embraced the possibility that the United States might exit the 
alliance at some point to wring concessions on issues of interest such as 
allied defense spending and terms of trade.5 Trump’s critics fear that his 
hardball tactics will drive a wedge between the United States and its 
European partners, endangering the transatlantic alliance. By signaling 
such disregard for NATO as an institution, his critics claim, Trump calls 
into question the institutional commitments that have been at the heart of 
the American- led order.6
The fact is, the Trump presidency is not the first time the shadow of exit 
has hung over the United States’ commitment to Europe. Indeed, a closer 
look at NATO’s formative period shows that the United States actively 
considered leaving Europe throughout the 1950s. Even after resigning 
itself to staying in the early 1960s, the United States used threats of aban-
donment to put down the Franco- German revolt—the most significant 
challenge to its preponderant position in the NATO alliance. The primary 
implication is that American alliance relations have been characterized by 
more uncertainty—and less restraint and reassurance—than institutionalists 
have cared to emphasize. This consequence paradoxically suggests that 
NATO, and the United States’ broader alliance network, is robust enough 
to survive President Trump’s attempts at coercion.7
 The remainder of this article examines NATO’s formative period in 
more detail, offering a corrective to the institutionalist account. The con-
clusion underscores an important implication for policy: less reassurance 
can sometimes be more.
The Formative Shadow of Exit
The institutionalist logic should readily explain NATO’s formative 
period, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s. According to institutionalists, 
this was a period when “American power was both tied down and bound 
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to Europe” by way of institutions like NATO. In effect, NATO served to 
reassure European allies that the United States would neither dominate 
nor abandon them.8 However, a shadow of exit hung over the US commit-
ment to Europe during the early Cold War. Throughout the 1950s, under 
Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, the United States saw 
its leadership role on the continent as a temporary expedient. As soon as 
European integration had proceeded far enough for a “third force” to 
emerge capable of balancing Soviet power on its own, the United States 
would withdraw from its forward positions and recede into the back-
ground. Moreover, the United States was not above threatening its European 
allies with abandonment when they failed to embrace the integration 
project with sufficient zeal. Most famous in this regard is the “agonizing 
reappraisal” that John Foster Dulles, secretary of state under Eisenhower, 
warned about in December 1953. In fact, an enduring American commit-
ment to Europe was not solidified until the early 1960s, under President 
John F. Kennedy.9 Even Kennedy, however, threatened to withdraw all US 
troops from Europe unless West Germany dialed back on security co-
operation with France, which jeopardized the preponderant position that the 
United States demanded in the NATO alliance as the price for it staying.
The Problem: Abandonment, Not Domination
Ikenberry, the leading institutionalist, is onto something when he ar-
gues that the United States was a “reluctant hegemon” in the post–World 
War II period.10 Especially important is his point that prospective allies in 
Europe worried more about abandonment than domination and worked 
hard to secure robust American security commitments.11 Reluctant hege-
mon, however, does not go far enough: it understates how determined the 
United States was to leave Europe once the balance of power was restored 
there. As important, the emphasis on strategic restraint and reassurance 
glosses over instances in which the United States threatened exit to wrest 
concessions from its European partners on the terms of its engagement—
most crucially in putting down the Franco- German revolt of 1963. 
“American power,” according to Ikenberry, “was both tied down and bound 
to Europe” during the early Cold War period.12 The claim here is that 
European allies had good reason to doubt the extent to which this was 
true, doubts that the United States fanned for its own benefit.
The US Commitment to Europe: Permanent or Temporary?
NATO, to paraphrase its first secretary general, was created in the late 
1940s to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans 
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down.”13 What is striking is how long it took the United States to reconcile 
itself to this fact: it was only in the early 1960s that the United States 
came to see its security commitment to Europe as more than a temporary 
expedient. This mind- set is a prominent theme in recent Cold War histo-
riography, much of it inspired by Marc Trachtenberg’s path- breaking account 
A Constructed Peace.14 James McAllister, for one, describes the idea that 
American military forces would permanently ensure European stability as 
“unthinkable” in the 1940s and 1950s. The historical record shows, in-
stead, that “American policymakers from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to 
Dwight Eisenhower strenuously tried to avoid having the future of 
Europe dependent on a permanent U.S. military presence on the 
continent.”15 Mark Sheetz concurs, noting, “Postwar American statesmen, 
such as Kennan, Dulles and Eisenhower, did not want European stability 
to be permanently dependent on the presence of American forces. They 
did not want to assume the burden of defending Europe permanently 
against the Soviet Union, nor did they want to serve permanently as Eu-
rope’s protector against a possible resurgence of German power. The 
purpose of America’s ‘temporary’ intervention in Western Europe was to 
eliminate the need for ‘permanent’ intervention.”16 In 1991 Trachtenberg 
himself observed, “During the crucial formative period in the early 1950s, 
everyone wanted a permanent American presence in Europe—everyone, 
that is, except the Americans themselves. It is hard to understand why the 
intensity and persistence of America’s desire to pull out as soon as she 
reasonably could has never been recognized, either in the public discussion 
or in the scholarly literature, because it comes through with unmistakable 
clarity” in government documents.17
If the United States intended its commitment to Europe to be tempo-
rary, how did it propose to solve the double containment problem that was 
at the heart of the Cold War? That is, how did it propose “to keep the 
Russians out and the Germans down”? The hope was that European inte-
gration would yield a third force on the continent, solving the double con-
tainment problem and allowing American forces to withdraw. McAllister, 
again, captures the thrust of US policy: “America’s overarching goal after 
1947 was to create a united Western Europe that could contain Germany 
and balance against the Soviet Union without a permanent U.S. military 
presence.” For US policy makers, “Western European unity was the ‘skele-
ton key’ that would permanently end the German problem and enable the 
region to become a third great center of power able to stand on its own 
without U.S. military forces continually serving as either a ‘pacifier’ or ‘pro-
tector.’ ”18 Sheetz reaches similar conclusions. “The Marshall Plan and 
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NATO,” he argues, “were designed to unify Western Europe, solve the 
German problem, and restore a rough balance on the European continent. 
The United States would then be able to relinquish responsibility for Eu-
ropean security.”19 The key point is that the United States was pulled into 
the NATO system only reluctantly; the goal, at least through the 1950s, 
was not to stay in Europe but to leave once a third force had emerged.20
The Agonizing Reappraisal
No American policy maker was more determined to leave Europe than 
Eisenhower. The basic concept of Eisenhower’s grand strategy, as Brendan 
Green relates, was the third force: “The United States would build Western 
Europe into an independent pole of power that could balance the Soviet 
Union by itself. The United States would then pass the buck, withdrawing 
its forces from the continent and positioning itself as the balancer of last 
resort.”21 Eisenhower pinned his hopes, in particular, on the European 
Defense Community (EDC), a treaty integrating the militaries of France, 
West Germany, and the Benelux states. If successful, the EDC would rep-
resent a local solution to the double containment problem, harnessing 
West German military power against the Soviet threat but with supra-
national controls to ensure that West Germany did not get too indepen-
dent or powerful.22 This strategy in turn would free the United States from 
having to make a long- term commitment to defend Europe, either from 
the Soviet Union or from a rearmed West Germany. For Eisenhower, 
avoiding such a commitment was imperative.23 In February 1951, newly 
installed as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Eisenhower wrote 
an associate, “There is no defense for Western Europe that depends exclu-
sively or even materially upon the existence, in Europe, of strong Ameri-
can units. The spirit must be here and the strength must be produced here. 
We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions 
if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What 
we must do is to assist these people [to] regain their confidence and get on 
their own military feet” (emphasis in original).24 For Eisenhower, the 
stationing of American troops in Europe was “a temporary expedient,” 
“a stop- gap operation” meant to bridge the gap until the EDC brought a 
third force into being.25
The problem for Eisenhower was that the Europeans—the French in 
particular—had strong incentives to drag their feet on the EDC, correctly 
suspecting that the intended end- state was an American withdrawal that 
would leave them alone on the continent with the Soviet Union and a 
rearmed West Germany. For the French, an American military commitment 
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was more attractive than the EDC. As Sebastian Rosato has argued, “A 
large American troop presence would protect western Europe from the 
Soviet Union and also contain the Germans, who could therefore be re-
armed to the benefit of the West without threatening France,” all without 
France having to surrender sovereignty to a supranational institution.26 
Frustrated by French intransigence, Dulles, an outspoken proponent of 
the EDC, resorted increasingly to threats to break the logjam. Most 
famous is the warning he delivered to the North Atlantic Council on 
14 December 1953 that if the EDC were to fail, “there would be grave 
doubt whether continental Europe could be made a place of safety,” which 
“would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy.”27 It 
was widely understood that such a reappraisal would point toward a with-
drawal from Europe. More precisely, the implied threat was that the 
United States would abandon the forward defense of the continent and 
adopt instead a peripheral strategy primarily reliant on airpower.28 As 
Dulles explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a January 1953 meeting, 
“If the French and Germans should come to see that the military position 
would be tolerable for us if we could hold Turkey, Spain, etc., that would 
create pressures on them which would not exist if they think we are so 
committed that we must carry the entire load in the area.”29
Given that the Eisenhower administration never followed through on 
its threats, it is tempting to write off the agonizing reappraisal as a calcu-
lated bluff.30 After all, the EDC died on 30 August 1954, with the French 
legislature rejecting the treaty on a procedural vote. Rather than abandon 
forward defense, the Eisenhower administration assented to an alternative 
arrangement—pushed by the British—whereby West Germany would 
join NATO with safeguards. Even factoring in the EDC’s demise, how-
ever, the agonizing reappraisal should not be discounted. First, as McAllister 
has argued, Dulles’s remarks may have been calculated, but they were not 
a bluff. Rather, they “accurately represented his deepest beliefs about the 
need for Europe to move on toward greater unity as a sheer matter of 
self- preservation as well as his fears about what would happen in the event 
the EDC did not come into being.”31 Second, the agonizing reappraisal 
was taken seriously by at least one key audience, the British, prompting 
them to break with a tradition of nonentanglement and make a long- term 
commitment to the defense of Europe.32 The British commitment, in turn, 
was a crucial ingredient in the NATO system that ultimately substituted 
for the EDC. Finally, the agonizing reappraisal demonstrates that the 
United States was willing to threaten withdrawal from Europe even dur-
ing the most intense phase of the Cold War.
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The Franco- German Revolt
With the benefit of hindsight, it is safe to conclude that Eisenhower 
overreached in his aspirations for a third force and the withdrawal of 
American troops from Europe.33 His successor, Kennedy, was more ame-
nable to a long- term commitment to NATO as the price that had to be 
paid for an enduring solution to the double containment problem. In 
return, Kennedy insisted on centralizing control over alliance policy, espe-
cially when it came to nuclear weapons, generating conflict with France. 
Exploiting the shadow of exit, Kennedy threatened to abandon West Ger-
many when it appeared to be following France’s lead. These threats were 
potent enough to put down the Franco- German revolt and lock in the 
United States’ preponderant position in the NATO alliance.
Kennedy’s Approach to Europe
Kennedy, unlike Eisenhower, considered an American military com-
mitment to Europe as inescapable, at least if the double containment 
problem was to be solved.34 A third force had not emerged to provide a 
counterweight to the Soviet Union—and might not be desirable in the 
first place if it meant a West Germany with too much power and indepen-
dence. Only the forward presence of American forces on European soil 
would suffice to check the Soviets while keeping German power limited. 
In return, Kennedy insisted on centralizing control over alliance policy; 
especially important was that West Germany not acquire independent 
control of nuclear weapons.35 The flexible response doctrine, for example, 
is best seen as a strategic rationalization for reasserted American control 
over NATO nuclear weapons, and thus a repudiation of the nuclear shar-
ing policy that had come to characterize Eisenhower’s approach to the 
issue.36 Kennedy’s basic stance, captured by Green, was that “if the United 
States was going to defend Europe, it was going to call the military and 
political shots.”37 The United States could not, Kennedy insisted, “accept 
the notion that we should stay out of all of Europe’s affairs while remain-
ing ready to defend her if war should come.”38 The United States would 
not issue that kind of blank check.
Putting Down the Franco- German Revolt
Kennedy’s warning was directed above all at the French, who were in-
creasingly assertive about voicing their displeasure with the centralizing 
thrust of American policy. French president Charles de Gaulle, in particu-
lar, was attracted to the idea of a “European” Europe led by France. France, 
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de Gaulle felt, should continue to enjoy the American security guarantee 
but otherwise should take the lead in settling political questions like the 
status of Germany. Kennedy, as we have already seen, rejected this way of 
thinking, setting up a collision with de Gaulle.39 De Gaulle’s intransi-
gence, in turn, emboldened the West Germans to dig in their heels on the 
nuclear issue, with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer ruling out 
a nonnuclear status for West Germany as part of a Berlin settlement.40
Matters between Kennedy, on the one hand, and de Gaulle and Adenauer, 
on the other, came to a head in early 1963. On 14 January 1963, de Gaulle 
inaugurated an open revolt against the United States, vetoing Britain’s 
admission to the European Economic Community (EEC). De Gaulle’s 
fear was that Britain would act as a Trojan horse for the United States, 
warning in a press conference that the continental countries would even-
tually be absorbed into a “colossal Atlantic community dependent on 
America and under American control” in the event Britain was let into the 
EEC.41 Even more provocatively, de Gaulle and Adenauer signed a treaty 
of friendship one week later, raising the specter of a Franco- German bloc 
independent of American influence.42 Kennedy was livid and prepared to 
believe the worst about de Gaulle, warning his advisers that “we should 
look now at the possibility that De Gaulle had concluded that he would 
make a deal with the Russians, break up NATO, and push the U.S. out 
of Europe.”43
To preclude this possibility and put down the Franco- German revolt, 
Kennedy threatened to abandon West Germany unless Adenauer—or a 
more pliable West German government—sided with the United States 
over France. “The Germans,” as Trachtenberg sums up Kennedy’s ap-
proach, “had to be told that ‘they can’t have it both ways.’ They had to 
choose between France and America. If they chose to align themselves 
with De Gaulle and if they backed the policy of an independent Europe, 
they could not count on the United States to defend them. If they wanted 
American protection, they would have to follow the American lead on 
political and nuclear questions.”44 And, indeed, Kennedy warned Adenauer 
directly in a February 1963 letter,
I would be less than frank if I did not convey to you my grave concern 
over the mounting suspicion in the American Congress and public that 
this Nation’s presence and views are no longer welcome in Europe. 
Those who feel that $45 billion and 16 years of continuous economic and 
military assistance have earned us nothing but the hostility of certain Eu-
ropean leaders and newspapers are likely to take out their resentment by 
pressing for a return to restrictive, isolationist concepts that would end 
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Western unity and, according to our best military judgment, seriously 
weaken the security of Western Europe as well as the United States.45
While Kennedy went on to say that he would do everything in his power to 
prevent this trend, the meaning was hardly lost on the West Germans, who 
in early 1963 watered down the Franco- German treaty with a preamble 
affirming their loyalty to NATO (and thus to the United States).46
West Germany’s about- face was crucial because Kennedy was only willing 
to stay in Europe if the United States was calling the political and military 
shots. The Cuban missile crisis, just a few months before, had underlined the 
real risk of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. This reality 
reinforced Kennedy in his insistence that the United States exercise pre-
eminent influence in NATO in exchange for defending Europe.
Less Reassurance Can Be More
Even though the United States actively considered leaving Europe 
throughout the 1950s, it resigned itself to staying in the early 1960s after 
securing a preponderant position in NATO. In the current moment, the 
Trump administration has paired a confrontational approach to alliance 
management with substantial continuity in core American commitments 
to European defense. An important implication follows: American alli-
ance relations have been characterized by more uncertainty—and less re-
straint and reassurance—than institutionalists have cared to emphasize, 
paradoxically suggesting that NATO and the United States’ broader alli-
ance network are robust enough to survive the Trump administration’s 
attempts at coercion.47
More generally, it is worth underscoring that there is such a thing as too 
much reassurance. One frequently hears the claim that allies need to be 
reassured sufficiently that they are not tempted to build up their power as 
a hedge against American abandonment.48 A felt need to reassure, in turn, 
has led policy makers to preoccupy themselves with credibility, to the 
point of treating reputation as if it were a vital interest. Policy makers, 
notes historian Robert McMahon, “have argued with remarkable consis-
tency, privately as well as publicly, that demonstrating the credibility of 
American power and American commitments ranked among the most 
critical of all U.S. foreign policy objectives.” He observes that they indeed 
“have often evinced as much concern for generalized perceptions of power, 
reputation, and prestige as they have with the preservation of more 
tangible interests.”49 One could argue that the United States has fought 
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multiple wars for the sake of its reputation, most prominently in Korea 
and Vietnam during the Cold War.50
Is reputation, in fact, worth fighting for? To a surprising degree, the 
evidence cuts against the notion that commitments are interdependent 
and thus that reputation deserves the importance that policy makers have 
ascribed to it. An exhaustive review of the literature is beyond the scope of 
this article, but a safe implication to draw from some of its seminal contri-
butions is that reputation has been overvalued.51
Ted Hopf, for example, notes how the United States became involved in 
various Third World conflicts during the Cold War, more to deter the Soviet 
Union than to protect any specific interest. Hopf highlights the lessons the 
Soviets learned from their victories and defeats in these conflicts, finding 
that “not a single Soviet in twenty- five years inferred anything about Ameri-
can credibility” in the core based on events in the periphery.52 Political 
scientist Jonathan Mercer leverages insights from social psychology to 
generate the counterintuitive argument that states are unlikely to get 
reputations for either lacking resolve among adversaries or for having 
resolve among allies. Bolstered by an examination of reputation forma-
tion in a series of pre–World War I crises, Mercer concludes, “It is wrong 
to believe that a state’s reputation for resolve is worth fighting for.”53 
Daryl Press, finally, pits the past actions theory, which says that the credi-
bility of a state’s threats depends on its history of keeping or breaking 
commitments, against the current calculus theory, which privileges the 
balance of power and interests. To evaluate these competing theories of 
credibility, Press examines decision- making during three sets of crises—
the “appeasement” crises between Nazi Germany and Britain and France 
before World War II, as well as Cold War crises between the Soviet 
Union and the United States over Berlin and Cuba. The cases reveal, 
Press argues, that “the very same leaders who are so concerned about their 
own country’s credibility that they are loath to back down reflexively ig-
nore the enemy’s history for keeping or breaking commitments.”54 Press, 
like Mercer, ends up concluding that states “should not fight wars for the 
sake of preserving their credibility.”55
On the one hand, it is understandable that policy makers take the need 
for reassurance seriously given the potentially high costs of being seen as 
an unreliable ally.56 An overemphasis on reassurance, however, in the form 
of unduly firm commitments risks entangling the United States in un-
wanted conflicts. The challenge is to be just reassuring enough that an 
alliance with the United States remains a desired commodity but not so 
reassuring that strategic flexibility is eliminated.57 In other words, policy 
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makers should balance the natural urge to reassure others about the firmness 
of American commitments with subtle (and sometimes unsubtle) reminders 
that exit remains an option, just as they did with NATO in the early Cold 
War and as the Trump administration is arguably doing now. 
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